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Abstract
This study examines public opinion in 15 European countries, on the proposal to
establish an independent European Central Bank (ECB). Using data from Euro-
barometer surveys for 1998 to 2000, which included a specific question on this issue,
we show that inflation performance is not sufficient to explain people’s preference
for an independent central bank: personal characteristics and circumstances have a
stronger impact, with gender, employment status, education level, income quartiles,
and degree of information and civic concern showing particular relevance.
Keywords: Central Bank Independence, Public Opinion, European Central Bank
1. Introduction
In the most recent decades, academics and governments have endorsed central
bank independence as a decisive feature in the achievement of lower, actual and
expected, inflation rates. Crowe and Meade (2007), notably, observe that countries
with higher levels of inflation in the past, have granted their central banks greater
independence. On the one hand, independence implies that the central bank is
insulated against influence and pressure from government officials, especially elected
ones. On the other hand, the central bank has to shoulder the blame if its policy does
not align with the needs of politicians or particular pressure groups. Central bank
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“bashing” might produce interesting pay offs for critical politicians (Waller, 1991)
unless the bank has the support of the population, in which case it may produce a
backlash, and the politicians’ political capital may be impaired, to the benefit of the
central bank’s credibility.
It is somewhat surprising, that public support for a central bank has not received
much research attention, with the exceptions of Leertouwer and Maier (2001), Maier
(2002), and Maier and Bezoen (2004), who focus on the Bundesbank and the Euro-
pean Central Bank and their policies, and rely mostly on media content analysis.
It could be argued that central bank would receive stronger support, and would
be able to implement even restrictive policies if the pros and cons of these policies are
understood by the general public, among which stand the foundations of its statutes,
i.e. its independence.
Our aim in this paper is to analyze public attitudes to central bank indepen-
dence. To do so, we make use of the case study provided by the foundation of the
European Central Bank (ECB). This historic event received great official attention
and provoked the inclusion in the Eurobarometer survey of a specific question in the
period of its founding. Although some authors study inflation aversion (Hayo, 1999)
or support for the euro (Ga¨rtner, 1997), the attitude of the general public towards
central bank independence has been overlooked. We rely here on the Eurobarometer
surveys conducted in 1998 to 2000, in 15 European countries to analyze opinions on
central bank independence.
Using data on the socio-demographic profiles of respondents and on inflation, this
paper examines the variation in the degree of support for an independent ECB and
investigates the following questions. First, how much does inflation performance, and
overall inflation history, influence public support for an independent central bank?
Second, to what extent are public attitudes to central bank independence shaped by
political ideology and demographic attributes?
Our results show that a country’s inflation history cannot, by itself, explain vari-
ations in the preferences of its population in favor of an independent central bank,
except if one considers that the current level of central bank independence reflects
such an history. If not, then it appears that individual personal characteristics and
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circumstances have a much greater impact. Among those characteristics, gender,
education, income, satisfaction with national democracy, interest in politics, level
of knowledge about regional policies and institutions, importance given to EU Par-
liament, access and use of media, and employment status are shown to have the
greatest relevance. The stakes are high because they involve the ECB’s legitimacy
(and, ultimately the Euro area’s sustainability) and a lack of understanding may
threaten the support for its degree of independence. This historical experience also
offers lessons for building, or reinforcing, independent monetary institutions.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the background literature;
Section 3 discusses the data and methodology; and Section 4 presents the results of
the estimates. Section 5 concludes with some suggestions for further research.
2. Literature Review
Studying attitudes and values is now recognized as an important source of in-
formation for economists. For instance, Walstad (1997) and Walstad and Rebeck
(2002) show that economic knowledge has a direct and significant effect on public
viewpoints on many economic issues, and that this knowledge is affected by factors
such as education, income, age, gender, race, and political party affiliation. Mayda
and Rodrik (2005) study attitudes to protectionism in a large set of countries and find
that attitudes towards trade are shaped by a complex set of both economic and non-
economic determinants. They find that the latter (socio-demographic background,
values, identities, attachments) play a very important role in explaining variations in
attitudes to trade. In another study on attitudes to trade, Hainmueller and Hiscox
(2006) examine the impact of education and find that individuals with college-level
educations are far more likely than others to favor trade openness.
In macroeconomics more particularly, survey data has proved useful. Scheve
(2004), for example, uses data on 20 advanced economies to examine public prefer-
ences about macroeconomic priorities, defined by inflation and unemployment per-
formance. He finds that lower income earners and women are less inflation averse,
while the politically conservative population is more inflation averse. Scheve also
finds a substantial difference in inflation aversion across countries and an increased
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inflation aversion over time. Along similar lines, Jayadev (2006) assesses the prefer-
ences of rich and poor towards anti-inflationary and anti-unemployment policy, using
data from the 1996 wave of the ISSP (International Social Survey Program) survey.
He finds that the poor are less likely than the rich to prioritize combating inflation
rather than unemployment.
The Eurobarometer survey data has been given relevance in several contexts. For
instance, Gabel (1998) analyzes the surveys conducted in the period 1978-1992 to
assess the relative significance of five theories of European integration. He shows
gender, age, and occupation to be relevant variables in explaining support for the
European integration process. Nelsen and Guth (2000) analyze the attitudes of men
and women to European integration. Based on data from Eurobarometer 42, they
find that gender has a significant impact on attitudes to European integration across
the European Union (EU) and Norway, with women showing less enthusiasm for
the process than men. They show also that women’s attitudes are influenced more
by greater knowledge about the EU and economic pessimism; men’s attitudes are
determined more by an interest in politics and a working-class status.1
Some studies examine macroeconomic and specific monetary issues using such
datasets. Hayo (1999), for example, investigates public attitudes to European Mon-
etary Union (EMU), making use of survey data from Eurobarometer 39 for the 12
original members of the EU. He concludes that a high level of knowledge about EMU
positively influences people’s opinions on monetary integration. Ga¨rtner (1997) ob-
serves that public attitudes towards the euro as a single currency depend on the
experience of past national monetary and fiscal policies and on the length of mem-
bership in the European Monetary System. People in countries that had experienced
high inflation and looser fiscal policies in the past were more in favor of the euro.
1In terms of European integration where heterogeneities inside countries can also be a concern
for the sustainability of the process, variations in domestic attitudes have been scrutinized. For
example, Me´on (2002) studies approval rates during the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in
France in 1992. His results show that approval rates were higher in departments where unemploy-
ment, long-term unemployment and past geographical mobility were low and social mobility was
high.
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In a study that is closer to our research, Hayo (1998) finds that inflation is ex-
plained not just by central bank independence, and that public attitudes towards
inflation exist and are interconnected with central bank independence.2 Based on
Eurobarometer survey data for the period 1976-1993 for European Community mem-
bers, Hayo finds evidence of a culture of stability in low-inflation countries whose
populations are more sensitive to increases in inflation.
However, and whatever the respective merits of the cited studies, there are no
existing ones on the determinants of support for central bank independence, and no-
one has exploited the responses to the specific questions on this which were included
in the Eurobarometer survey during the time of the ECB’s foundation. This paper
contributes by filling this gap.
3. Data and Methodology
The creation of the ECB was a historic event in modern history that was observed
with great attention, and the drafters of the constitution of the ECB made necessary
decisions about its [future] independence. The ECB was established by the so-called
Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1998). Both treaties
contain all the conditions imposed by governments to gain access to the monetary
union. It was stated that monetary union could not take place later than 1 January
1999, that the European Central Bank in charge of managing the single currency was
to be created before that date, and that the work of its predecessor, the European
Monetary Institute (EMI) had to be completed before. The independence of the
ECB is ensured in its founding treaty. According to Article 108 of the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community (EC):“Neither the European Central Bank (ECB),
nor a national central bank (NCB), nor any member of their decision-making bodies
may seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, governments
of the Member States or any other body”. The institutional independence of the
ECB is further strengthened by its financial independence, as the ECB has its own
2Results in Vaubel (2003) also point to the fact that the sensitivity of the general public to
inflation is more significant than central bank independence to explain inflation performance.
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budget and cannot bail governments. Some other provisions are also held to ensure
the independence of the ECB which include the security tenure of governors of the
ECB. An extensive theoretical analysis and empirical evidence on central bank in-
dependence laid down the institutional framework of independence of the ECB. As
a part of that process, a specific question was included in Eurobarometer surveys to
ask Europeans about the independence of their [future] central bank.
We use these data from the Eurobarometer surveys. These surveys, on issues of
general interest, have been conducted on behalf of the European Commission since
1973. The results are published in Eurobarometer and are available to researchers
at the Gesis website.3 We use information from Eurobarometer 49 to 53, covering
the surveys conducted from May 1998 to April 2000. In 1998 and 1999, there were
two surveys per year; in 2000 there was only one survey that included the question
that we are interested in. We pooled data on these five waves.4 The surveys were
administered to citizens from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many5, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, and Sweden. Tables 1 provides some descriptive statistics. Respondents from
the representative samples in each country were asked to assess the following state-
ment (Question n 25 in Eurobarometer 49) about the proposal for an independent
European central bank:
“With the European currency, the Euro, there has to be a European Central Bank
which is independent of the member states.”
The responses are recorded as follows: 1 “in favor”, 2 “against”, 3 “don’t know”.6
3http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp
4We also estimated the regressions using data from only three surveys conducted in the same
period of time over three years; the results (available on request from the authors) do not differ
significantly.
5East and West.
6The respondents in this category were imputed using multiple imputation technique and all
equations were re-estimated to check the robustness of our results, without any qualitative modifi-
cations of the results. Moreover, as one cannot reject the possibility that respondents first decide
to have an opinion and then decide which opinion to have, we run a Heckman selection model.
However we conclude in favor of the absence of a selection bias. Full results are available upon
request.
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Table 1: Support for Central Bank Independence in 15 EU countries
Countries Code 1998 1999 2000
For Against For Against For Against
France FRA 1,485 302 1,406 373 693 195
Belgium BEL 1,354 255 1,547 275 787 164
Netherlands NLD 1,754 179 1,680 159 808 79
GermanyΩ DEU 2,722 595 2,868 641 1,335 417
Italy ITA 1,419 185 1,464 199 732 124
Luxembourg LUX 963 147 940 112 461 76
Denmark DNK 1,323 470 1,303 487 631 269
Ireland IRL 1,346 155 1,509 138 694 108
Great Britain GBR 1,150 510 969 587 420 363
Greece GRC 1,384 300 1,303 379 612 178
Spain ESP 1,248 216 1,242 243 700 118
Portugal PRT 1,106 186 1,285 207 672 109
Finland FIN 1,481 290 1,486 333 668 189
Sweden SWE 1,348 365 1,365 350 605 285
Austria AUT 1,289 288 1,314 289 635 163
Total 21,372 4,443 21,681 4,772 10,453 2,837
Ω East+West
We measure support or otherwise for the proposal for an independent European
central bank based on “in favor” or “against” responses.7 Public attitudes in favor
of an independent ECB during the three years are depicted in Figure 1. Support
was strongest in Ireland and the Netherlands8; Great Britain’s citizens - consistently
over the three years – were the least supportive of an independent ECB. Countries
belonging to the EMU and current non-EMU members show clear differences in
their support for an independent ECB (see Figure 1). However, in both groups of
7As in every survey, the framing of the question may suffer from interpretative biases from the
respondents, which cannot be avoided. Among these, the possibility that respondents answer while
having in mind the independence of any central bank (i.e. not the particular case of the ECB)
figures out prominently, as will become apparent below in our results. Also, if one assumes that
the general public does not know much about monetary policy, the importance of the independence
from the member states may be misunderstood. As a consequence, all our conclusions have to be
read with this cautionary note in mind.
8Of course, one reason for the relatively strong support for the ECB observed in the Netherlands
may be the fact that Wim Duisenberg was the first president of the ECB.
7
Figure 1: Support of an independent ECB–by Country
countries, there is a slight trend (apparent in Figure 1) towards decreasing support
as time passes and the prospect of European monetary union (and the establishment
of the ECB) gets closer.
In line with the literature investigating public preferences for economic issues,
socio-demographic variables are considered to evaluate their influence on the opin-
ions of individuals about the desirability of central bank independence. The role of
individual characteristics and circumstances is measured through gender, age, edu-
cation, income, employment status, political placement, level of knowledge about the
EU, degree of political information and civic concern, and importance given to EU
Parliament. Gender has been shown to be important in evaluations of individuals’
responses, with Nelsen and Guth (2000) and Scheve (2004) indicating that women
are less enthusiastic about economic issues.
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Age can also be a decisive factor: Farvaque et al. (2010) show that the share of
older people in the population acts as a strong weight against inflation, and Mal-
mendier and Nagel (2009) show that individuals of different ages react differently to
past inflation experience.
Walstad (1997) and Walstad and Rebeck (2002) observe that education plays as a
vital role in shaping an individual’s preference for an economic issue, as in measuring
labor market skills and cognitive abilities (a feature confirmed in, e.g., Scheve, 2004).
But there is a lack of consensus about the effect of education on specific economic
issues: for example, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) find that if people with college
education are relatively pro-trade, other education degrees are not significant for
evaluating trade policy. Here, the variable Education is the age of the respondent
when full-time education was discontinued, and is an ordered categorical variable
measured on a 1 to 4 scale where 1 is “up to 15 years”, 2 is “still studying”, 3 is “16
to 19 years”, and 4 is “20+ years”.
The income variable ranges from 1 to 4, and indicates whether the respondent
is in the first, second, third, or fourth quartile of the income distribution in the
respondent’s country. As stated above, this variable proved influential in Jayadev
(2006) in terms of people’s aversion to inflation and therefore might be relevant in
terms of supporting the establishment of an independent central bank.
Hudson (2006) presents evidence that personal circumstance have a strong impact
on an individual’s trust in institutions. Among these circumstances, employment sta-
tus is of course important: unemployed people may be more averse to an independent
(and thus more conservative) central bank since independence might lead to a dis-
tortion of the Phillips curve trade-off that can arise at very low levels of inflation
(see Akerlof et al., 1996; Stock and Watson, 2010). This distortion can increase the
sacrifice ratio, and may be perceived as costly by (part of) the electorate, notably
the unemployed segment of the society.9
9Even though the precise mechanism may not be fully understood by laypeople, the results of the
literature (see for example Scheve, 2004, or van Lelyveld, 1999) can be understood as a confirming
such an interpretation.
9
Political ideology is accounted for by a political placement indicator (i.e. the
way people position themselves on the political axis from “left” to “right” through
“center”). Political placement obviously can change peoples’ attitudes to important
economic issues, especially inflation. We add to this indicator others related to
frequency of “discussion of political matters” and “satisfaction with democracy in
[one’s] country”. These should reflect the degree of political information and civic
concern of the individual. More precisely, frequency of the political discussions is
indicative of the individual’s interest in current politics.
Respondents that are more interested in political discussion and debate can be
expected to be more informed about current political scenarios and affairs, and thus
about the costs/benefits of central bank independence. The degree of satisfaction
with national democracy captures the respondent’s trust in the current national polit-
ical system. As Anderson (1998) shows, a higher degree of satisfaction with domestic
politics increases the support for European institutions. However, as Carey (2002)
and Sa´nchez-Cuenca (2000) claim, it might also be the case that people dissatisfied
with national politics might support the EU because they see it as a remedy for
unsatisfactory domestic politics. The sign of this relation (which can be understood
as a matter of complementarity or substitutability between national and European
institutions) therefore needs to be settled empirically in the case of the foundation
of a European central bank.
We include two variables that measure the level of knowledge about the EU,
its policies and institutions, and access to and use of information sources, in order
to check the respondent’s level of information and awareness.10 Knowledge about
the EU and its policies is measured on a three point scale of low, good and very
good, while access to and use of information sources is captured by a media use
index. Nelson (1975) observes that newspapers are important in disseminating the
knowledge that the individuals incorporate into their information set. The index of
10Blinder and Krueger (2004) observe that a majority of respondents in a representative sample
of America show a strong desire to be well informed about major economic policy issues and that
the main sources of information they consider are television and newspapers.
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media use is constructed based on the frequency of watching the news on television,
reading a daily newspaper, and listening to the news on the radio, in a week. This
index is an ordered categorical variable with four categories: low, fair, frequent, and
very frequent. The first category low (use of information sources) is based on the use
of three media (television, newspapers, radio) no more than once or twice a week.
Fair captures one of the three media every day or several times a week, and the other
two, not more than once or twice a week. Frequent is based on two media every day
or several times a week, the third medium not more than once or twice a week. The
last group, the more frequent users, are the respondents who follow news on TV,
radio, and newspapers every day or several times a week. This index determines the
information level of a respondent about current economic and political issues in the
country. Unfortunately, this index is only available for three surveys, in 1998 and
1999.
To account for the general attitudes of the respondents towards the EU and
its institutions, we include the responses for the question about the importance of
the European Parliament. Euro-skeptics are probably much less likely to favor an
independent European institution, if only because it is another European one. The
importance of the European Parliament is asked to be judged on a four point scale:
not at all, not very important, important and very important. Table 2 presents the
descriptive statistics of variables while summary statistics in favor of central bank
independence are presented Table 3.
As already stated, central bank independence and inflation are strongly (and neg-
atively) correlated, a feature repeatedly evidenced in the literature (see e.g., Carl-
strom and Fuerst, 2009). Also, inflation shapes public opinion on the policies of a
central bank. To account for this, we include the current and historical inflation,
and the maximum inflation that the respondent has known in her lifetime. We also
consider the degree of central bank independence in the respondent’s country (data
taken from Polillo and Guille´n (2005), which allows to have time-varying measures
of central bank independence). These form the baseline variables in our estimates of
public opinion on the desirability of central bank independence. Data on inflation
come from the International Financial Statistics which measure inflation as the an-
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Min Max
Gender 0.52 0.5 0 1
Age (Exact) 43.87 17.87 15 99
Age (categories) 2.45 0.95 1 4
Age Education (categories) 2.19 0.96 1 4
Income Quartiles 2.47 1.11 1 4
Unemployed 0.06 0.23 1 0
Retired 0.2 0.41 1 0
Political Ideology 1.93 0.76 1 3
Political Discussion 1.83 0.63 1 3
Democracy Satisfaction 2.62 0.79 1 4
EU Parliament Importance 3.09 0.79 1 4
EU Knowledge 1.52 0.62 1 3
Use of Media 3.14 0.9 1 4
Inflation(t) 1.79 1.12 –0.27 5.56
Inflation (t-1) 1.74 1.11 –0.27 5.54
5 years average Inflation 2.57 1.70 0.77 9.60
10 years average Inflation 3.89 2.58 1.88 13.09
Maximum Inflation 16.48 7.12 3.18 30.0
CBI Index 0.81 0.14 0.47 0.92
nual percentage change in the consumer price index.11 Introducing macroeconomic
variables is standard in the type of research implemented here, and is even more per-
tinent to the questions in this study since macroeconomic experience can strongly
shape people’s preferences and thus their attitudes. This is even more important
that De Haan and Van’t Hag (1995) and Vaubel (2003) show that the experience
of hyperinflation since 1900 has a significantly positive effect on central bank inde-
pendence. However, it also has to be acknowledged that the impact of such extreme
11Data on maximum inflation for Germany before 1992 is obtained from Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010).
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Opinion in Favor of an Independent ECB
Variables Mean Std. Observations
Full Sample 0.82 0.39 65,558
Breakdown by:
Gender
Male 0.83 0.38 33,105
Female 0.81 0.40 32,453
Age
15-24 years 0.83 0.38 10,755
25-44 years 0.82 0.38 25,678
45-64 years 0.82 0.39 19,387
65+ years 0.78 0.42 9,730
Education
Less than 15 years 0.77 0.42 15,968
16-19 years 0.81 0.39 24,876
20+ years 0.85 0.35 17,290
Still Studying 0.84 0.37 7,350
Occupation
Unemployed 0.78 0.41 3,680
Retired 0.78 0.41 13,005
Income Quartiles
Q1 0.76 0.43 10,907
Q2 0.8 0.40 11,815
Q3 0.83 0.37 12,450
Q4 0.86 0.35 11,990
Political Ideology
Left 0.81 0.39 17,827
Center 0.82 0.38 23,232
Right 0.83 0.38 14,212
Political Discussion
Never 0.78 0.42 17,354
Occasional 0.83 0.38 38,663
Frequent 0.83 0.38 9,162
Democracy Satisfaction
Not at all satisfied 0.69 0.46 4,634
Not very satisfied 0.78 0.42 14,531
Fairly satisfied 0.85 0.36 26,595
Very satisfied 0.85 0.36 5,318
EU Parliament Importance
Not at all important 0.59 0.49 1,740
Not very important 0.77 0.42 9,454
Important 0.85 0.36 27,701
Very important 0.85 0.36 19,071
EU Knowledge
Low 0.79 0.41 32,367
Good 0.85 0.36 27,336
Very good 0.85 0.36 4,881
Use of Media
Low use 0.76 0.43 1,663
Fair use 0.81 0.39 7,106
Frequent use 0.82 0.38 12,589
More frequent use 0.84 0.36 17,988
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experiences may decay, as shown by Ehrmann and Tzamourani (2011).12
Since our dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the values of one
and zero depending on the respondent’s opinion in favor or against the proposal of
independence of ECB, we observe that
yijt = 1 if y
∗
ijt > 0
yijt = 0 if y
∗
ijt ≤ 0
where
y∗ijt = X
′
ijtβ + ϕj + τt + ǫijt (1)
Equation (1) represents how an individual’s support for central bank independence
y∗ijt depends on the vectors of the observed variables (Xijt), unobserved country effects
(ϕj) and time effects (τt) and a random error (ǫijt). The probability of support can
be written as
Pr (yijt = 1 | X) = Pr
(
y∗ijt > 0 | X
)
= Pr[ǫijt > −(X
′
ijtβ+ϕj+τt) | X] = F (X
′
ijtβ+ϕj+τt)
So our regression equation takes the form
CBOPijt = α + β
′
lInfjt + γ
′
mCBIjt + λ
′
nDijt + δ
′
vPijt + η
′
uIijt + ϕj + τt + εijt (2)
where CBOPijt is the opinion of a respondent i in country j at the time of the
survey, Infjt is the inflation (historical inflation or maximum inflation experienced)
at time of survey in the jth country, CBIjt is the central bank independence index
in country j at the time of the survey, Dijt is a vector of “socio-demographic” char-
acteristics such as gender, age, education, employment status and income, Pijt is the
political ideology of the ith respondent at the time of the survey, Iijt is the level
of information and civic concern of the respondent. Unobserved country effects and
time effects are represented by ϕj and τt respectively whereas εijt is the error term.
We estimate the parameters of model (2) using logit regressions. Also, since
12Note however that the analysis in Vaubel (2003) does not only indicate that central bank
independence is less significant than sensitivity to inflation in explaining inflation, but that central
bank independence drops out if sensitivity to inflation is included.
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we are merging country level inflation with micro data, it is important to consider
the possibility that disturbances will be correlated across countries. Moulton (1990)
shows that standard errors from a usual maximum likelihood estimation can be bi-
ased seriously downwards if the disturbances are correlated within the groupings that
are used to merge aggregate with individual-level data. Hence, standard errors are
clustered by country and require the much weaker assumption that errors are inde-
pendent across countries but not necessarily across every survey respondent within
a country.
Another important issue in the analysis is the weighting of the survey data. We
follow the suggestion of Dumouchel and Duncan (1983) to include sampling weights
and interaction terms between the weights and the independent variables in the
regressions to detect possible misspecifications. In almost all cases, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the coefficients of the sampling weights and the interactions terms
are equal to zero. This indicates that our results are not sensitive to the weighting
and thus we base our results on unweighted data.
Finally, it has to be acknowledged that every econometric analysis of survey data,
as in this study, has some intrinsic limitations. Firstly, much of the data is categorical
in nature, even for the variables of continuous nature, like income. Secondly, as with
any survey data, there is limited item non-responses for some variables. The large
number of observations cannot fully offset these caveats: the statistical robustness
of the results should not forbid one to consider them with a pinch of salt.
4. Empirical Evidence
We first present the baseline evidence on the influence of current and historical
inflation experience and the level of central bank independence on public opinion for
the establishment of an independent central bank. Historical inflation is successively
defined by the one-year lagged, and the five- and ten-year average inflation expe-
rienced by each country prior to the survey and maximum inflation known in the
respondent’s lifetime. Results are reported in Table 4.
The estimated marginal effects for all inflation types (current inflation, lagged
inflation and historical long-term inflations, measured by the five- and ten-year av-
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erages) are insignificant. The only significant measure related to inflation is the
maximum inflation known in the respondent’s lifetime. The negative sign however
indicates that respondents consider that independence of the central bank may not
by itself reduce the possibility of high or hyper-inflation in the future, except if the
central bank of the respondent’s country is already independent, as the level of cur-
rent independence of the central bank is positive and significant, with a coefficient
superior to the one on maximum inflation. Hence, all in all, our results suggests that
inflation aversion may be mediated by central bank independence.
The results in Table 4 show important cross-country variations. If Germany is
considered as the reference country, the coefficient estimates of each country indicate
whether support for an independent ECB is lower or higher than in Germany holding
all other variables at their mean. We see that respondents in Denmark, Great Britain,
and Sweden show much lower degrees of support for an independent ECB. The
substantial difference in the magnitudes of the coefficients is the highest for the
marginal effects for estimate (1), with coefficients equal, for Great Britain, to -0.155,
compared to 0.097, for the Netherlands. This means that, controlling for economic
performance, the average UK citizen is estimated to have an expected probability of
0.58 in favor of an independent ECB, compared to 0.88 for the Netherlands and 0.76
for Germany. Hence, there are clear national differences in attitudes towards ECB
independence, with an apparent cleavage between the prospective members of the
(present) Euro area and the more reluctant candidates.
Table 5 details the results of an extended equation, adding individual respondent
characteristics to maximum inflation and country and year effects. Note that the
measure of maximum inflation also loses its significance when combined with indi-
vidual characteristics. These attributes clearly dominate respondents’ behavior, but
it is not the case with central bank independence, which is generally significant and
positive. Hence, living in a country with a high degree of independence of the cen-
tral bank strongly impacts the support for a new independent central bank, which
hints at a perception by the general public of the benefits of such an institutional
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Table 4: Impact of Current and Historical Inflation Experience
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inflation(t) 0.008
(0.006)
Inflation(t-1) 0.005
(0.007)
5-Years Average Inflation -0.003
(0.008)
10-Years Average Inflation 0.01
(0.012)
Maximum Inflation -0.002***
(0.001)
CBI Index 0.056*** 0.063*** 0.060*** 0.052** 0.061***
(0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.022)
France 0.005** 0.007** 0.005* 0.009** 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Belgium 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.030***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
The Netherlands 0.097*** 0.102*** 0.109*** 0.102*** 0.101***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
Italy 0.062*** 0.067*** 0.077*** 0.053** 0.076***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.022) (0.002)
Luxembourg 0.065*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.063***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Denmark -0.065*** -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.054***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Ireland 0.084*** 0.093*** 0.099*** 0.092*** 0.100***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Great Britain -0.155*** -0.144*** -0.131*** -0.159*** -0.119***
(0.013) (0.022) (0.019) (0.033) (0.016)
Greece -0.037** -0.032 0.01 -0.135 0.005
(0.018) (0.029) (0.055) (0.165) (0.006)
Spain 0.032*** 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.024 0.053***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.025) (0.004)
Portugal 0.043*** 0.050*** 0.062*** 0.015 0.071***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.052) (0.006)
Finland 0.012** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Sweden -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.044** -0.032***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.020) (0.004)
Austria 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.007*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 65,558 65,558 65,558 65,558 65,558
Pseudo R-Sq 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Notes: The table reports estimated average marginal effects with robust standard errors
clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated using time fixed effects.
Germany is the reference country. ** p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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arrangement.13
Gender is significant across all the estimated models, and has a negative sign
indicating that women, ceteris paribus, are less passionate about ECB independence.
As already stated, this is be related to the more general trend in women’s attitudes to
economic issues, or to a more asserted knowledge by men (Williamson and Wearing,
1996). In considering how the age of the respondent impacts on his or her support
for the CBI, our estimates show that age reveals no significance on the support.
The most prominent impact, visible in nearly all the specifications, is related to
education. Number of years of education has a positive influence on respondents’
support for an independent ECB. Recall that the variable is defined as the age when
the respondent finished full time education; note also that the reference category is
those individuals who left full time education at age 15 or before. We can see then
that respondents with the highest education levels are more supportive of an inde-
pendent ECB. This is consistent with the literature on public opinions on economic
issues. The coefficients of the people who left education at age 20 or over are nearly
twice as high as the coefficients of those who left in their teenage years. This may
also signal a knowledge of foreign languages, which could help to understand what
is going on at the European level.
In comparing occupations, unemployed and retired respondents are less enthusi-
astic about central bank independence. The result for unemployment is consistent
with the hypothesis of a higher concern for a worse unemployment-inflation trade-off
at low levels of inflation.14 Retired people are less negative about central bank inde-
pendence than the unemployed, which may be a sign that they would be less affected
by the existence of an independent central bank since their preferences intrinsically
tend towards low inflation (if only because the degree of nominal indexation of pen-
13Such a result qualifies Van Lelyveld (1999), who could not find a relation between historical
inflation experience and survey respondents degree of inflation aversion. This relation could be
mediated by the independence the central bank has received (Farvaque and Mihailov, 2009).
14In such a situation, the unemployment rate in the country may appear as a natural macroeco-
nomic determinant, but due to a strong degree of correlation between inflation and unemployment
rates, we are unable to introduce it at this stage.
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sions is generally lower than for wages, or because their accumulated assets may not
be protected against inflation).15
The coefficients of income quartiles are positive, showing (with the first - lowest -
quartile as the reference) that support for an independent central bank is increasing
with income. This result is consistent with those in Scheve (2004) and Jayadev
(2006) on inflation aversion. Scheve (2004) explains that all else being equal, low-
income groups have a higher probability of unemployment. Consequently lower-
income groups are more concerned about unemployment than inflation. This section
of the population may be more fearful of the implications, in terms of a less active
monetary policy for instance, of a more independent central bank. This result is also
confirmed by the negative coefficient of Unemployed (the priorities of people on the
dole will more likely be a greater concern for a less active monetary policy, see above),
and a positive coefficient of the higher income quartiles, revealing that higher income
individuals are more in favor of an independent central bank. Schneider and Frey
(1987) also observe that high income recipients are more concerned about inflation
because they are more seriously affected by it.
Affiliation to a political spectrum in the country has no effect on support for
an independent central bank. These results on political orientation are in line with
those in Kaltenthaler et al. (2010) but contrast with those in Scheve (2004). How-
ever, although political affiliation does not seem to matter, knowledge about politics
and intensity of political discussions have significant positive impacts for an indepen-
dent ECB. Individuals who discuss politics occasionally or frequently place higher
support for independence than people who never discuss political matters. These
results tend to show that people with greater awareness and/or greater civic concern
are more supportive of independence. This is confirmed by the result that better
access and use of information (measured by the media use index) has a sizeable im-
pact on people’s opinions. The coefficients of the three categories are positive and
significant (with lowest use of media as the reference level), and show that higher
levels of media use promote higher support for an independent ECB. This result
15Note that the retirement variable is potentially picking up the age effect.
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for the European population as a whole echoes a study by van der Cruijsen et al.
(2010) on Dutch households, which shows that use of media correlates with knowl-
edge and understanding of the ECB’s monetary policy. Our results also show that
more knowledge about regional politics and institutions has a positive impact on
support for the independence of a ECB, as well as the perceived importance of the
European Parliament . The latter shows that the higher the degree of perception of
the importance of the European Parliament, the higher the support for the European
central bank independence.16
Finally, satisfaction with national democracy is positive and significant. Indi-
viduals more satisfied with their national democracy are more supportive of the
independence of the ECB, compared to the respondents with lower levels of satisfac-
tion. The magnitudes of the coefficients of the ‘fairly satisfied’ and ‘very satisfied’
groups are nearly twice as high as those in the ‘not very satisfied’ category. This
could mean that respondents consider that the national government was right to
agree to an independent ECB.
This provides another important insight, that people who tend to be satisfied
with their national political system are more supportive of an independent ECB.
This adds to the support for the now traditional view of the gains from delegating
monetary policy to an independent institution (Rogoff, 1985), and to the idea that
national and European institutions are complementary more than substitutes (see,
e.g., Anderson, 1998), since dissatisfied populations think that upper-tier levels of
government will help remedy the misery of national politics.
If the data were available, it would be interesting to compare our dataset on
attitudes with data related to other periods and other continents; nevertheless, our
results from the founding period of the ECB are important.
First, even though central bank independence is now recognized by pundits to
be an important feature of any monetary institutional setting, our results tend to
16Note that, in line with the potential interpretative biases we mentioned above, the respondents
who know more about the EU and the European Parliament may also be more supportive of a
European Central Bank, whatever its degree of independence.
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Table 5: Socio-demographic Factors and Political Ideology
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Maximum Inflation -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CBI Index 0.059*** -0.013 0.068*** 0.074*** 0.086** 0.022 -0.039 0.092*** 1.328***
(0.023) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.020) (0.030) (0.021) (0.133)
Gender -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.015** -0.016*** -0.015** -0.016*** -0.013** -0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Unemployed -0.032*** -0.013 -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.021*** -0.029*** 0.001 -0.033*** -0.014
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Retired -0.015** -0.004 -0.017** -0.016** -0.013* -0.014* -0.002 -0.019** -0.011
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Age (BL:65+ years)
15-24 years -0.006 -0.023 -0.003 0.003 -0.01 -0.011 -0.034** 0.012 -0.027
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.027)
25-44 years 0.002 -0.006 0.004 0.004 0.006 -0.006 -0.008 0.008 -0.006
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
45-64 years 0.013 0.003 0.013* 0.012 0.013 0.005 -0.004 0.016 -0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Education (BL:Up to 15 years)
Still studying 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.059*** 0.048**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.020)
16-19 years 0.043*** 0.027*** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.017* 0.035*** 0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
20 and above 0.093*** 0.071*** 0.088*** 0.081*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.052*** 0.081*** 0.046***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015)
Income Quartiles (BL:Q1)
Q2 0.032*** 0.012 0.016*
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Q3 0.056*** 0.040*** 0.043***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Q4 0.079*** 0.056*** 0.051***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
Political Ideology (BL:Centre)
Left -0.013 -0.016 -0.013 -0.012 -0.02
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Right 0.006 0.005 0.01 0.012 0.012
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Political Discussion (BL:Never)
Occasionally 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.019*** 0.014*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Frequently 0.041*** 0.047*** 0.016** 0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012)
Satisfaction with Democracy
(BL:Not at all satisfied)
Not very satisfied 0.090*** 0.082*** 0.065***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Fairly satisfied 0.156*** 0.134*** 0.106***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Very satisfied 0.170*** 0.155*** 0.123***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
EU Knowledge (BL:Low)
Good 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.030***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Very good 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.027***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
EU Parliament Importance
(BL:Not at all important)
Not very important 0.182*** 0.143*** 0.159***
(0.019) (0.024) (0.023)
Important 0.268*** 0.224*** 0.252***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.033)
Very important 0.315*** 0.275*** 0.299***
(0.036) (0.031) (0.030)
Media use Index(BL:Low use)ξ
Fair use 0.060*** 0.070***
(0.009) (0.016)
Frequent Use 0.070*** 0.061***
(0.016) (0.019)
More Frequent Use 0.092*** 0.072***
(0.015) (0.019)
Observations 6= 65,476 47,118 55,207 54,934 42,923 57,156 29,195 39,310 14,656
Adjusted Pseudo R-Sq 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.08
Notes: The table reports estimated average marginal effect.All regressions include country and year dummy variables. Robust standard errors
clustered by country are presented under each marginal effect. ξ Not available for 2000.
6= All models were also re-estimated after imputing the missing observations using multiple imputation technique; results were qualitatively
unchanged and are available on request. BL:Basline; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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show that the general public is able to endorse its importance. Second, for countries
considering whether to establish a new central bank or to revise/amend central bank
laws, our results show clearly that the general public can be driven to understand
these reforms, and the window of opportunity for their introduction may be larger
than had been assumed (Acemoglu et al., 2008). Thirdly, our results have some
implications for central bank policies and communication strategies. Although they
indicate a fairly good support for their independence, they reveal that some parts
of society are less enthusiastic. Central banks need to maintain communication
and diffusion of information to the public generally and also focus on and provide
more specific information to those groups that our study has revealed as being less
convinced.
To check for the robustness of our results, we have run several other estimates.
First, even though the surveys we make use of do not include the specific infla-
tion perceptions or expectations, they however include an “Economic expectations”
variable. Even though this variable (asking respondents if they think that future
economic situation will be worse, better or if they expect no change) is not avail-
able for all the surveys, we have run estimates that provide for a robustness check
of our result with regard to the inclusion of specific economic perceptions from the
respondents. Our results are basically identical and including this variable, although
estimates are based on a much smaller number of observations, are fully supportive
of our baseline estimates. Second, we have computed respondents’ maximum adult
lifetime inflation rates (“maximum inflation experienced after the age of 15”). This
variable is also insignificant and our results are in conformity with the previous ones
with the maximum inflation experienced.17
5. Conclusion
This study examines public opinion in Europe on the proposal to establish an
independent European Central Bank (ECB). The benefits of central bank indepen-
dence have been extensively examined and are no longer disputed since there is
17The results are available from the authors upon request.
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ample empirical evidence that it results in lower inflation and ensures a more stable
economic environment. As a consequence, central bank independence has increased
since the 1990s. Yet, there has been no comprehensive analysis of public preferences
for central bank independence. This paper provides such an investigation, based
on Eurobarometer opinion surveys in 15 European countries over the period 1998
to 2000, building on the historical event of the foundation of the European Central
Bank.
We study individual level characteristics and inflation factors that shape mass
opinion in favor of central bank independence. Our logistic regression estimates
demonstrate that inflation by itself is not sufficient to explain peoples’ support for
an independent central bank in Europe. Individual characteristics and circumstances
play a bigger role in shaping preferences for central bank independence. Significant
features include gender (women are less supportive), education (support increases
with education), income (higher income means higher support), satisfaction with
national democracy (greater satisfaction increases support), frequent discussion of
politics (more frequent discussion results in more support), knowledge about the
EU (higher level of information leads to higher support), importance given to EU
Parliament (higher importance given leads to higher support), use of media (more
regular news consumption translates into more support) and employment status (un-
employed and retired are less supportive). Moreover, our results show that current
level of central bank independence strongly impacts public opinion in favor of estab-
lishing an independent central bank.
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